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Abstract
We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice single-
peaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the
necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can
be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule.
We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they
are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
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1 Introduction
We characterize the class of all strategy-proof and simple rules defined on the domain
of semilattice single-peaked preferences. A rule is a systematic procedure to select
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an alternative as a function of the declared profile of agents’ preferences. A rule
is strategy-proof if for each agent truthful declaration is optimal regardless of the
other agents’ declared preferences. A rule is simple if it is tops-only (the selected
alternative depends only on the profile of top alternatives), unanimous (whenever all
agents agree that an alternative is the most preferred one, the rule selects it), and
anonymous (agents’ identities do not play any role).
The notion of semilattice single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of the classical
notion of single-peakedness, identified by Black (1948) as a natural and meaningful
restriction on preferences whenever the set of alternatives is linearly ordered.1 A
preference is single-peaked if there is a unique most preferred alternative (the top),
and alternatives further away from the top, in each of the two possible directions of
the linear order, are less preferred than alternatives closer to the top. Moulin (1980)
characterizes the family of all strategy-proof and tops-only rules on the domain of
single-peaked preferences.
Semilattice single-peakedness requires that the underlying order structure on the
set of alternatives is a (join-)semilattice and that the preference is decreasing further
away from the top, only in the increasing direction of the semilattice.2
There are at least three reasons to study the domain of semilattice single-peaked
preferences.
First, semilattice single-peakedness may represent a substantial weakening of the
single-peaked condition, meaningful whenever agents’ preferences are restricted (by
the underlying partial order structure on the set of alternatives) only along a par-
ticular direction of the partial order, and not in others. Since a strategy-proof and
simple rule on a domain of preferences remains strategy-proof and simple in any of its
subdomains, characterizations of strategy-proof and simple rules on larger domains
are useful because they identify rules that will remain strategy-proof and simple even
if the rule would have to operate only on any of its subdomains.
Second, many of the domain restrictions identified in the literature as domains
admitting strategy-proof rules satisfy weak versions of single-peakedness.3 Thus, one
1A set is linearly ordered if there is a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation over
it.
2A partial order over a set is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation. A partial
order is a (join-)semillatice if every pair of elements in the set has a least upper bound, named the
supremum of the pair.
3Among others, Demange (1982), Border and Jordan (1983), Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou
(1991), Barbera`, Gu¨l and Stacchetti (1993), Danilov (1994), Barbera`, Masso´ and Neme (1997),
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may read these results as identifying single-peakedness as a sufficient condition to be
satisfied by a domain in order to guarantee that the domain admits the possibility
of designing on it strategy-proof rules. However, all those domains are subsets of
semilattice single-peaked preferences.
Third, semilattice single-peakedness is roughly the necessary condition that a rich
domain has to satisfy in order to admit a strategy-proof and simple rule.4 Some
recent papers have tried to identify the key property of a domain of preferences
admitting strategy-proof and simple rules. Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013) identifies
a structure on the set of alternatives for which the domain of preferences over this
set has to be semi single-peaked, an extended weak version of single-peakedness for
finite sets of alternatives with a tree structure induced by a connectedness property
of the domain. That is, if a domain is rich and connected then semi single-peakedness
is a necessary condition that any set of preferences has to satisfy in order to admit a
strategy-proof and simple rule, whenever the number of agents is even. Chatterji and
Masso´ (2018) takes a similar approach to the one taken by Chatterji, Sanver and Sen
(2013) but without assuming any a priori structure on the set of alternatives nor a
connectedness property of the domain. They show that when the number of agents is
even, if a rich domain admits a strategy-proof and simple rule then the domain has to
be a subset of the set of semilattice single-peaked preferences, where the semilattice
from which semilattice single-peakedness is defined is obtained from the rule. They
also show that given any set of alternatives, partially ordered by a semilattice (denoted
by ), the rule that selects at each preference profile the supremum (according to )
of the set of tops is strategy-proof and simple on the domain of semilattice single-
peaked preferences, regardless of whether the number of agents is even or odd. We
refer to this rule as the supremum rule and denote it by sup.
Our aim in this paper is to identify the class of all strategy-proof and simple
rules defined on a semilattice single-peaked domain. Specifically, assume that the
set of alternatives A is partially ordered by a semilattice . Consider the set of all
Peremans, Peters, van der Stel and Storcken (1997), Barbera`, Masso´ and Serizawa (1998), Schummer
and Vohra (2002), Barbera`, Masso´ and Neme (2005) and Weymark (2008) study the family of
strategy-proof rules (or some of its subfamilies) in settings where the set of alternatives has a more
complex structure than just a linear order. In each of these generalizations, single-peakedness still
appears as a natural and meaningful domain restriction.
4Observe that if the domain of preferences is not rich (i.e. too small in a precise sense), strategy-
proofness loses all of its bite, and then arbitrary (and not rich) domains may trivially appear as
being necessary for the possibility of admitting strategy-proof and simple rules.
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semilattice single-peaked preferences relative to the semilattice (A,). Theorem 1
characterizes the family of all strategy-proof and simple rules on this domain.5 One
of the main consequences of Theorem 1 is the following. Assume that the set of
alternatives A does not have a supremum according to the semilattice .6 Then,
the supremum rule is the unique strategy-proof and simple rule on the domain of
semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,). To understand this result remember
that in Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) the property of semilattice single-peakedness is
defined relative to the partial order induced by the rule itself. Hence, in this case
the domain is so tailor-made to the rule that it only admits the supremum rule. And
the supremum rule is strategy-proof and simple even when the set of alternatives has
a supremum, denoted by α (i.e.; α ≻ x for all x in A different from α). However,
in this case other rules may also be strategy-proof and simple, and we identify all
of them by the following procedure. Consider the set of alternatives A⋆() with the
property that each alternative in the set is (strictly) related by the semilattice only
to α. If the set A⋆() is empty, then the sup is again the unique strategy-proof and
simple rule on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences over A (note that
α /∈ A⋆()). If this set is non-empty, for each alternative x belonging to A⋆() and
each integer 1 ≤ qx < n, where n is the number of agents, define a rule f on the
domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,) as follows. Consider any
profile of semilattice single-peaked preferences R. If the number of agents with top
on x is larger or equal to qx, set f(R) = x; otherwise, f(R) is equal to the supremum
(according to ) of the set of top alternatives in the profile R. A rule f that can be
described in this way is named a quota-supremum rule.
Our main result says that the class composed by the supremum of the original
semilattice , the sup rule, and the family of all quota-supremum rules, one for
each pair composed by x ∈ A⋆() and 1 ≤ qx < n, coincides with the class of all
strategy-proof and simple rules on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences
on (A,). We also obtain additional results related to the quota-supremum rules and
show that the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,) is maximal for
the sup rule; namely, the sup rule is not strategy-proof on any domain of preferences
strictly containing the set of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,).
5We already know that this family is non-empty because the sup rule is one of them.
6The fact that (A,) is a semilattice guarantees that any pair of alternatives has supremum (the
least upper bound of the pair of alternatives), but if A is not finite it may or it may not have, as a
set, supremum (a least upper bound of A).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains basic notation and defini-
tions, the definition of semilattice single-peakedness, and preliminary results. Section
3 contains the main result of the paper. In Section 4 we illustrate our result by
applying it to the setting of two well-known restricted domains of preferences: the
domain of single-peaked preferences over a subset of real numbers and the domain of
separable preferences over the family of all subsets of a given set of objects. Section
5 contains the definition of rich domain, the statement that any semilattice single-
peaked domain is rich, and some additional results. Section 6 concludes with two
final remarks. The Appendix at the end of the paper contains the statements and
proofs of some remarks and lemmata that will be used in the proof of the main result,
and collects the proofs that are omitted in the text.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic notation and definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the finite set of agents, with n ≥ 2, and A be any set of
alternatives. The set A can be finite or infinite. We assume throughout the paper
that |A| > 2.7 Each agent i ∈ N has a preference (relation) Ri ∈ D over A, where D
is an arbitrary and given subset of complete and transitive binary relations over A.8
The set D is referred to as the domain of preferences. For any x, y ∈ A, xRiy means
that agent i considers alternative x to be at least as good as alternative y. Let Pi
and Ii denote the strict and indifference relations induced by Ri over A, respectively.
9
We assume that for each Ri ∈ D there exists t(Ri) ∈ A, the top of Ri, such that
t(Ri)Piy for all y ∈ A\{t(Ri)}. For x ∈ A, we denote by R
x
i an arbitrary preference
in D with t(Rxi ) = x. Let R denote the universal domain of preferences over A with a
unique top. We also assume that for each x ∈ A the domain D contains at least one
preference Rxi . A profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ D
n is an n−tuple of preferences, one for
each agent. To emphasize the role of agent i or subset of agents S we will often write
the profile R as (Ri, R−i) or as (RS, R−S).
7The cardinality of any given set X is denoted by |X |. The case |A| = 2 is very especial and
discussed in the Final Remarks section at the end of the paper.
8A binary relation  over A is complete if for all x, y ∈ A either x  y or y  x and it is transitive
if for all x, y, z ∈ A, x  y and y  z imply x  z.
9Namely, for any x, y ∈ A, xPiy if and only if xRiy and yRix does not hold, and xIiy if and only
if xRiy and yRix.
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A (social choice) rule is a mapping f : Dn → A that assigns to every profile
R ∈ Dn an alternative f(R) ∈ A.
A rule f : Dn → A is tops-only if for all R,R′ ∈ Dn such that t(Ri) = t(R
′
i)
for all i ∈ N , f(R) = f(R′). Hence, a tops-only rule f : Dn → A can be written
as f : An → A. Accordingly, whenever f be tops-only we will use the notation
f(t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)) interchangeably with f(R1, . . . , Rn).
A rule f : Dn → A is unanimous if for all R ∈ Dn and x ∈ A such that t(Ri) = x
for all i ∈ N , f(R) = x.
To define an anonymous rule on Dn define, for every profile R ∈ Dn and every one-
to-one mapping σ : N → N , the profile Rσ = (Rσ(1), . . . , Rσ(n)) as the σ−permutation
of R, where for all i ∈ N , Rσ(i) is the preference that agent σ(i) had in the profile R.
Observe that the domain Dn is closed under permutations, since it is the Cartesian
product of the same set D. A rule f : Dn → A is anonymous if for all one-to-one
mappings σ : N → N and all R ∈ Dn, f(Rσ) = f(R).
Preferences are idiosyncratic and agents’ private information, and they have to
be elicited by means of a rule. A rule is strategy-proof if for every agent at every
preference profile truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation
game induced by the rule at the preference profile. Formally, a rule f : Dn → A is
strategy-proof if for all R ∈ Dn, all i ∈ N and all R′i ∈ D,
f(R)Rif(R
′
i, R−i).
We say that agent i can manipulate f at R if there exists R′i ∈ D such that
f(R′i, R−i)Pif(R).
We are interested in strategy-proof rules satisfying in addition unanimity, anonymity
and tops-onlyness. Unanimity is a natural and weak form of efficiency: if all agents
consider an alternative as being the most-preferred one, the rule should select it.
Anonymity imposes that the rule treats all agents equally: the social outcome is
selected without paying attention to the identities of the agents. Tops-onlyness con-
stitutes a basic simplicity requirement. We will refer to a tops-only, anonymous and
unanimous rule as a simple rule.
We will assume that the set A is partially ordered by a binary relation  that is
a semilattice over A; namely, for all x, y, z ∈ A, (i) x  x (reflexivity), (ii) x  y
and y  x imply x = y (antisymmetry), and (iii) x  y and y  z imply x  z
(transitivity). The partial order  is a (join-)semilattice over A if for each pair
x, y ∈ A the least upper bound of {x, y} exists; in this case it is named the supremum
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of x and y, and it is denoted by sup{x, y}.
10 A semilattice  over A will often be
denoted by (A,). Given a semilattice (A,) and x, y ∈ A, we write x ≻ y if x  y
and x 6= y.
Fix a binary relation  over A. Given two alternatives x, y ∈ A with y  x, define
the set [x, y] as
[x, y] = {z ∈ A | y  z and z  x}.
If x and y are two distinct alternatives and related by  as y  x, then the set [x, y]
is obtained by adding to the set {x, y} all alternatives in A that “lie between” x and
y according to  . For y  x define [x, y] = ∅.
2.2 Semilattice single-peakedness
Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) shows that if a rich domain of preferences admits a
strategy-proof and simple rule f : Dn → A, for n even, then all preferences in
the domain D have to be semilattice single-peaked, where the semilattice from which
semilattice single-peakedness is defined is identified from the rule. As we have already
said in the Introduction, this notion constitutes a weakening of single-peakedness
and contains as particular cases many of the domains identified in the restricted
domain literature; for instance, those studied in Moulin (1980), Demange (1982),
Border and Jordan (1983), Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991), Barbera`, Gu¨l
and Stacchetti (1993), Danilov (1994), Peremans, Peters, van der Stel and Storcken
(1997), Barbera`, Masso´ and Serizawa (1998), Schummer and Vohra (2001), Weymark
(2008) and Chatterji, Sanver and Sen (2013).11 Following Chatterji and Masso´, we
now define semilattice single-peaked preferences on a semilattice (A,).
Definition 1 Let  be a semilattice over A and let x ∈ A. The preference Rxi ∈ D is
semilattice single-peaked on (A,) if, for all y, z ∈ A, sup{x, y}R
x
i sup{z, y}.
Example 1 at the end of this section illustrates this definition. Given a semilattice
 over A, denote by SSP() the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences on
(A,).
10Given x, y ∈ A, an element z ∈ A is an upper bound of {x, y} if z  x and z  y. An element
t ∈ A is the supremum of {x, y} if and only if (i) t is an upper bound of {x, y} and (ii) w  t for all
upper bound w of {x, y} (i.e., t is the least upper bound of {x, y}).
11Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) carefully describes some of these inclusions.
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2.3 Preliminary results and example
Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) characterizes semilattice single-peakedness by means of
two properties, the first one more directly related to the notion of single-peakedness.
Remark 1 states this result, which will be very useful in the sequel.
Remark 1 Let  be a semilattice over A and let x ∈ A. The preference Rxi ∈ D is
semilattice single-peaked on (A,) if and only if the following two properties hold:
(i) for all y, z ∈ A such that x  y  z, yRxi z;
(ii) for all w ∈ A such that x  w, sup{x, w}R
x
iw.
The well-known notion of single-peakedness on a linearly ordered set can be nat-
urally extended to a set that is partially ordered by a semilattice.
Definition 2 Let  be a semilattice over A and let x ∈ A. The preference Rxi ∈ D
is single-peaked on (A,) if the following two properties hold:
(i) for all y, z ∈ A such that x  y ≺ z or z ≺ y  x, yP xi z;
(ii) for all w ∈ A such that x  w, sup{x, w}P
x
i w.
Given a semilattice  over A, denote by SP() the domain of single-peaked
preferences on (A,).
Remark 2 For every semilattice  over A, SP() ⊂ SSP() holds immediately by
their definitions. To see that the inclusion may be strict, consider the set of alter-
natives A = {x, y, z} and let  be such that x  y  z. Then, SP() ( SSP()
because Rxi such that zP
x
i y belongs to SSP() but not to SP().
Remark 3 When the semilattice  is a linear order over A, condition (i) in Defini-
tion 2 still generalizes the usual definition of single-peakedness. Moreover, if condition
(i) holds then condition (ii) is redundant since x  w implies, by completeness of ,
that x ≻ w and so sup{x, w} = xP
x
i w follows trivially.
Example 1 illustrates the notion of semilattice single-peakedness.
Example 1 Let A = {x1, . . . , x9} be a set with nine alternatives and let  be the
semilattice represented in Figure 1 where, for any xk, xk′ ∈ A, an arrow from xk to
xk′ means xk′ ≻ xk, and arrows that would follow from transitivity are deleted.
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r ✲x1 r ✲x2 r ✲x3 r ✲x4 r ✲x5 r ✲x6 rx7
r
✻
x8
r
✻
x9
Figure 1
The set of SSP() is large but restricted; in particular, the set of strict preferences
listed in Table 1 are semilattice single-peaked on (A,), while the ones listed in Table
2 are not. Each column represents a strict preference with the convention that an
alternative located in a row is strictly preferred to all alternatives located in lower
rows.12
P x3i P̂
x3
i P
x8
i P̂
x8
i P
x5
i
x3 x3 x8 x8 x5
x4 x2 x5 x5 x3
x5 x1 x6 x6 x8
x1 x4 x9 x7 x4
x2 x5 x7 x9 x6
x6 x8 x1 x4 x7
x7 x6 x3 x3 x9
x9 x9 x2 x2 x2
x8 x7 x4 x1 x1
Table 1
P
x3
i P˜
x3
i P
x8
i P˜
x8
i
x3 x3 x8 x8
x5 x2 x6 x4
x4 x1 x9 x6
x1 x4 x5 x7
x2 x8 x7 x9
x6 x5 x1 x5
x7 x6 x3 x2
x9 x9 x2 x3
x8 x7 x4 x1
Table 2
Preferences P x3i , P̂
x3
i , P
x8
i , P̂
x8
i and P
x5
i belong to SSP() because, for instance,
according to Definition 1, and Remark 1,
• sup{x3, x4} = x4P
x3
i x5 = sup{x5, x4}, sup{x3, x8} = x5P
x3
i x6 = sup{x9, x8},
– x3 ≺ x4 ≺ x5 and x4P
x3
i x5, and sup{x3, x8} = x5P
x3
i x8.
• sup{x8, x6} = x6P
x8
i x7 = sup{x7, x6}, sup{x8, x3} = x5P
x8
i x6 = sup{x9, x3},
– x8 ≺ x6 ≺ x7 and x6P
x8
i x7, and sup{x8, x9} = x6P
x3
i x9.
12To ease the exposition in this and all examples that follow we only consider strict preferences.
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Preferences P
x3
i , P˜
x3
i , P
x8
i and P˜
x8
i do not belong to SSP() because, for instance,
according to Definition 1, and Remark 1,
• sup{x3, x4} = x4 and x5 = sup{x5, x4}, but x5P
x3
i x4,
– x3 ≺ x4 ≺ x5 and x5P
x3
i x4.
• sup{x8, x5} = x5 and x6 = sup{x5, x9}, but x6P
x8
i x5,
– x8 ≺ x5 ≺ x6 and x6P
x8
i x5.
However, preference P̂ x3i belongs to SP() but preference P
x3
i does not because, for
instance, according to Definition 2,
• x1 ≺ x2 ≺ x3 and x2P̂
x3
i x1, but x1P
x3
i x2. 
3 Main result
Our goal in this paper is to characterize, for any semilattice (A,), the class of all
strategy-proof and simple rules on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences
SSP().We start by defining, given a semilattice (A,), the supremum rule sup on
the domain SSP(). We then argue that the supremum rule is simple and strategy-
proof on SSP().
Let (A,) be a semilattice and let SSP() be the set of semilattice single-peaked
preferences on (A,). The supremum rule, denoted as sup : SSP()
n → A, is
defined by setting, for each profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ SSP()
n,
sup(R1, . . . , Rn) = sup{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)}.
The supremum rule sup is unanimous, anonymous and tops-only by definition, and
so it is simple. To see that sup is strategy-proof first define t(R) = {t(Ri) : i ∈ N}
as the set of (different) tops at profile R and t(R−i) = {t(Rj) : j ∈ N\{i)}. Next,
consider any profile R ∈ SSP()n, agent i ∈ N and preference R′i ∈ SSP(). By
semilattice single-peakedness,
sup(R) = sup{t(Ri), supt(R−i)} Ri sup{t(R
′
i), supt(R−i)} = sup(R
′
i, R−i).
Thus, sup is strategy-proof.
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However, there are semilattices (A,) for which sup is not the unique strategy-
proof and simple rule on SSP(). Theorem 1 below identifies the class of all strategy-
proof and simple rules on the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. To
state this characterization we need the following notation and definitions. Given
R ∈ SSP()n and x ∈ A, define N(R, x) = {i ∈ N : t(Ri) = x} as the set of agents
whose top is x at profile R. Assume A has a supremum, denoted as supA = α.
13
Namely, there is α ∈ A such that α ≻ x for all x ∈ A\{α}. Let
A⋆() = {x ∈ A : for each y ∈ A \ {α}, x  y and y  x}
be the set of alternatives that, according to , are not related to any other alternative
but α. Observe that α /∈ A⋆(); for instance, for A = {x, y, z} and the semilattice
x ≻ y, x ≻ z, y ⊁ z and z ⊁ y, supA = x and A
⋆() = {y, z}. Moreover, A⋆()
may be empty; for instance, in the case of the semilattice considered in Example 1.
Definition 3 Let  be a semilattice over A such that supA exists. The rule f :
SSP()n → A is a quota-supremum rule if there are x ∈ A⋆() and integer qx
with 1 ≤ qx < n such that, for every R ∈ SSP()n,
f(R) =
{
x if |N(R, x)| ≥ qx
sup t(R) otherwise.
We refer to the alternative x ∈ A⋆(), whose existence makes f to be a quota-
supremum rule, as the alternative associated to f , and to qx as the quota of x. Given
x ∈ A⋆() we can generate a new semilattice, the one obtained from the original one
by declaring x to be above α, and maintaining all the other binary comparisons not
involving x as in the original semilattice. Example 2 below illustrates this procedure.
Denote by Q() the set of quota-supremum rules defined on SSP(), and by
F() the set of strategy-proof and simple rules defined on SSP(). We know that
F() 6= ∅ since we have just argued that sup is strategy-proof and simple. The
main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1 Let  be a semilattice over A. The rule f : SSP()n → A is strategy-
proof and simple if and only if f = sup or f is a quota-supremum; i.e.,
F() = {sup} ∪ Q().
Proof See Appendix 7.5. 
13We are abusing a bit the notation and use sup to denote the supremum rule and supA to
denote the supremum of the set A.
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Corollary 1 Let  be a semilattice over A such that supA does not exist. Then,
Q() = ∅ and F() = {sup}.
Example 2 illustrates the content of Theorem 1 when n = 2 and indicates a
procedure to identify for this case, the full class of strategy-proof and simple rules on
the domain SSP(); namely, all quota-supremum rules.
Example 2 Let A = {x, y, z} be the set of alternatives and let N = {1, 2} be the
set of agents. Consider the semilattice (A,1), where x ≻1 y, x ≻1 z, y ⊁1 z and
z ⊁1 y. Obviously, sup1 A = x and the supremum rule sup1 = f1 can be described
by
f1(x, y) = x
f1(x, z) = x
f1(y, z) = x
together with the corresponding choices required by unanimity and anonymity. Ob-
serve that A⋆(1) = {y, z}. Then, the set of (strict) semilattice single-peaked prefer-
ences SSP(1) on (A,1) contains the four preferences listed in Table 3 where, for
any pair a, b ∈ {x, y, z}, P abi refers to the unique strict preference aP
ab
i bP
ab
i c.
P xyi P
xz
i P
yx
i P
zx
i
x x y z
y z x x
z y z y
Table 3
Consider now the two semilattices (A,2) and (A,3), where 2 and 3 are obtained
from 1 by setting y ≻2 x and z ≻3 x, respectively, and adding the relations implied
by transitivity. Figure 2 represents 1, 2 and 3, where an arrow between two
alternatives points to their supremum, and arrows that would follow by transitivity
are omitted.
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Hence, the rules sup2 = f2 and sup3 = f3 can be described by
f2(x, y) = y
f2(x, z) = x
f2(y, z) = y
and
f3(x, y) = x
f3(x, z) = z
f3(y, z) = z
together with the corresponding choices required by unanimity and anonymity. Ob-
serve that A⋆(2) = A
⋆(3) = ∅ and f2, f3 ∈ Q(1), where f2 and f3 can also be
seen as the quota-supremum rules associated respectively to y and z (in this case, and
since there are only two agents, the only admissible quota for any quota-supremum
rule is equal to 1). Given the semilattice 1, the set of strategy-proof and simple
rules on SSP(1) is the set F(1) = {f1, f2, f3}. 
For any n ≥ 2, a quota-supremum rule with associated alternative x ∈ A⋆() and
quota qx = 1 can also be described as the supremum of a slightly modified semilattice.
Let (A,) be a semilattice and let x ∈ A⋆(). Define the semilattice x onA obtained
from  by setting x ≻x y for all y ∈ A\{x} and, for all y, z ∈ A\{x}, y ≻x z if
and only if y ≻ z. If f : SSP()n → A is a quota-supremum rule with associated
alternative x and quota qx = 1, then f(R) = supx t(R) for all R ∈ SSP()
n. Asking
for the support of at least one agent for x, and otherwise selecting the supremum of
all tops according to , is equivalent to obtaining directly the supremum of all tops,
according to x.
To see that all quota-supremum rules with quota one are strategy-proof, fix a
quota-supremum rule f : SSP()n → A, where x ∈ A⋆() is its associated alterna-
tive and qx = 1. Let Ryi ∈ SSP() and R−i ∈ SSP()
n−1 be arbitrary. If y = x
then f(Ryi , R−i) = y, and i cannot manipulate f at (R
y
i , R−i). If y 6= x, we distin-
guish between two cases. First, suppose x ∈ t(Ryi , R−i); then, f(R
y
i , R−i) = x and
f(R′i, R−i) = x for all R
′
i ∈ SSP(), and i cannot manipulate f at (R
y
i , R−i). Second,
suppose x /∈ t(Ryi , R−i); then, f(R
y
i , R−i) = sup t(R
y
i , R−i). If sup t(R
y
i , R−i) = y,
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agent i cannot manipulate f at (Ryi , R−i). If sup t(R
y
i , R−i) 6= y we distinguish be-
tween two subcases. First, suppose t(R′i) 6= x; then,
y ≺ f(Ryi , R−i)  sup t(R
′
i, R−i) = f(R
′
i, R−i),
but by semilattice single-peakedness, f(Ryi , R−i)R
y
i f(R
′
i, R−i), and i cannot manip-
ulate f at (Ryi , R−i) with R
′
i. Second, suppose t(R
′
i) = x; then f(R
′
i, R−i) = x and
since
y ≺ f(Ryi , R−i) ≺ sup t(R
′
i, R−i) = supA
and y  f(R′i, R−i) = x, by (ii) in Remark 1 characterizing semilattice single-
peakedness and transitivity of Ryi , f(R
y
i , R−i)R
y
i f(R
′
i, R−i) = x, and i cannot ma-
nipulate f at (Ryi , R−i) with R
′
i. Thus, f is strategy-proof and trivially simple. In
the proof of Theorem 1, in Appendix 7.5, we extend this argument from the case
qx = 1 to any quota 1 < qx < n, and show that any strategy-proof and simple
rule f : SSP()n → A is either the sup rule if supA does not exist or else a
quota-supremum rule.
4 Two examples
In this section we illustrate our result by applying it to the setting of two well-known
restricted domains of preferences. The example in Subsection 4.1 corresponds to the
domain of single-peaked preferences over a subset of real numbers. The example in
Subsection 4.2 corresponds to the domain of separable preferences over the family
of all subsets of a given set of objects. In each of the two examples we identify the
semilattices and their corresponding rules that, among the class of all strategy-proof
and simple rules on the single-peaked or separable domains, remain strategy-proof on
the larger domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences. Moreover we show how,
according to our result, these rules can be described either as the supremum of the
underlying semilattice or as quota-supremum rules.
4.1 Median voters
The set of alternatives A is a subset of real numbers. We distinguish between two
cases, depending on whether A is equal to the real line R (as in Moulin (1980)) or A
is finite (as the one-dimensional case in Barbera`, Gu¨l and Stachetti (1993)).
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4.1.1 Moulin (1980)
The set A is the set of real numbers R, linearly ordered by the binary relation ≥ (“to
be larger or equal than”), and agents preferences are single-peaked (relative to ≥)
over R.14 We first consider the case where the semilattice on R coincides with the
binary relation ≥. Then, the semilattice (R,≥) does not have supremum and the set
of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (R,≥) is
SSP(≥) = {Ri ∈ R : t(Ri) = x for some x ∈ R and x < y < z implies yRiz}.
That is, a semilattice single-peaked preference Ri ∈ SSP(≥) is decreasing on the
right of its top alternative, and it is unrestricted between pairs of alternatives that
are either on the left of the top or on different sides of the top. Figure 3 depicts a
semilattice single-peaked preference Ri ∈ SSP(≥) with top on alternative x.
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Since A⋆(≥) = ∅, Theorem 1 says that the unique strategy-proof and simple rule on
SSP(≥)n is the sup≥ rule, which corresponds in Moulin (1980)’s characterization of
all strategy-proof and simple rules on the domain of single-peaked preferences (relative
to ≥) to the median voter rule where n − 1 fixed votes are located at +∞; that is,
for each R ∈ SSP(≥)n,
sup≥(R) = sup≥{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)}
= median≥{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn),+∞, . . . ,+∞︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)-times
}.
14Namely, the preference Ri over R is single-peaked (relative to ≥) if (i) Ri has a unique top
alternative t(Ri) and (ii) y < x < t(Ri) or t(Ri) < x < y implies xRiy.
15Preferences in SSP(≥) would arise naturally when agents are willing to consume the public
good only at higher levels of their top alternatives. For instance, if the linear order ≥ represents
the flow of a river, semilattice single-peakedness would reflect the fact that agents are able to
move (i.e., consume the good) using only the flow of the river. Semilattice single-peakedness does
not impose restrictions on how agents order alternatives upstream of their top alternatives but it
requires monotonicity downstream.
15
We now consider other cases where the semilattice over R does not coincide with
the binary relation ≥ and the supremum rule can be identified with a median voter
rule. For any fixed α ∈ R, consider the semilattice  where y < x ≤ α or α ≤ x < y
implies x ≻ y and x < α < y implies x  y and y  x. Thus, sup = α and the set
of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (R,) is
SSP() = {Ri ∈ R : t(Ri) = x for some x ∈ R,
t(Ri) < y < z ≤ α or α ≤ z < y < t(Ri) implies yRiz and
t(Ri)  y and y  t(Ri) imply sup{t(Ri), y} = αRiy}.
That is, a semilattice single-peaked preference Ri ∈ SSP() is decreasing from t(Ri)
towards α and the preference between pairs of alternatives after α, all according
to , are unrestricted but none is strictly preferred to α. Figure 4 represents this
semilattice (as arrows pointing to α) and depicts a semilattice single-peaked preference
Ri ∈ SSP() on (R,).
t(Ri)
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Since A⋆() = ∅ also holds, Theorem 1 says that the unique strategy-proof and simple
rule on SSP()n is the sup, which corresponds, in the previously mentioned Moulin
(1980)’s characterization, to the median voter rule (relative to ≥) where n− 1 fixed
votes are located at α; that is, for each R ∈ SSP()n,
sup(R) = sup{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)}
= median≥{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn), α, . . . , α︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)-times
}.
4.1.2 Barbera`, Gu¨l and Stachetti (1993)
The set A is a finite subset of real numbers. Without loss of generality suppose
that A = {x1, . . . , xM}, where x1 < · · · < xM . We distinguish between two types of
semilattices over A, depending on whether or not the semilattice has the property
that there is one alternative that is related only to the supremum.
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First consider any semilattice  with the property that, for some m such that
1 ≤ m ≤ M , supA = xm and A
⋆() = ∅; for instance the case m = M and
x1 ≺ . . . ≺ xM or the case 2 < m < M−1 and x1 ≺ x2 ≺ · · · ≺ xm and xM ≺ xM−1 ≺
· · · ≺ xm. Then, the set SSP() of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,)
is the natural extension of the set for the continuous case to this discrete setting.
Again, Theorem 1 says that the unique strategy-proof and simple rule on SSP()n
is the sup rule. This rule can also be represented as the median≥, according to the
ordering ≥, of the set of the profile of tops and (n − 1) fixed votes located at xm.
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Namely, for each R ∈ SSP()n,
sup(R) = sup{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn)}
= median≥{t(R1), . . . , t(Rn), xm, . . . , xm︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n−1)-times
}.
Suppose now that M ≥ 4 and consider the semilattice such that and x1 ≺ x2 ≺
· · · ≺ xM−1 and xM ≺ xM−1. Figure 5 depicts the case M = 6.
r ✲x1 r ✲x2 r ✲x3 r ✲x4 rx5
r
✻
x6
Figure 5
Then, sup≻A = xM−1, A
⋆() = xM and the set of semilattice single-peaked prefer-
ences on (R,) is
SSP() = {Ri ∈ R : t(Ri) = xm for some xm ∈ A,
if m = M then xM−1Rixj for all j < M − 1 and
if m < M − 1 then xm ≺ xj ≺ xj′  xM−1 implies xjRixj′ and xM−1RixM}.
Observe that when t(Ri) = xM−1, Ri is unrestricted. It is easy to see that the family
of quota-supremum rules on the domain SSP()n with associated alternative xM
16Moreover, and according to the description of median voters by means of left-coalition systems
used in Barbera`, Gu¨l and Stachetti (1993), this rule corresponds to the case (using also the ordering
x1 < . . . < xM to define the left-coalition system) where the family of winning coalitions for all
alternatives xj < xm is equal to N , while the family of winning coalitions for all alternatives
xj ≥ xm is equal to 2N\{∅}.
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and quota 1 ≤ q < n, denoted by {f q}q=n−1q=1 , can be described as median voter rules,
where the n− 1 fixed votes α1, . . . , αn−1 are given in Table 4, and by setting for each
R ∈ SSP()n,
f q(R) = median≥{t(R1, . . . , t(Rn), α1, . . . , αn−1},
where the fixed votes α1, . . . αn−1 are given by the row corresponding to quota q in
Table 4.
Quota Fixed votes at xM−1 Fixed votes at xM
q = 1 none α1 = · · · = αn−1 = xM
q = 2 α1 = xM−1 α2 = · · · = αn−1 = xM
...
...
...
q = k α1 = · · · = αk−1 = xM−1 αk = · · · = αn−1 = xM
...
...
...
q = n− 1 α1 = · · · = αn−2 = xM−1 αn−1 = xM
Table 4
4.2 Voting by committees
Consider the special case of voting by quota studied by Barbera`, Sonnenschein and
Zhou (1991) with two objects.17 A society has to choose a subset from a given set of
two objects {a, b}. Namely, the set of alternatives is A = {{∅}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}}
which can be identified with the unit vertices of the two-dimensional cube A =
{(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}. Moreover, agents’ preferences are separable: adding an
object to a set that does not contain the object makes the set strictly preferred to
the original set if and only the added object is strictly preferred to the empty set (as
a singleton set, the object is good). Denote by S the set of all strict and separable
preferences over A. Let  be the semilattice represented in Figure 5, where an ar-
row between two alternatives points to their supremum, and the arrow that would
follow from transitivity is omitted. It holds that S ( SSP(); for instance, the
preference P
(1,1)
i where (1, 1)P
(1,1)
i (0, 0)P
(1,1)
i (1, 0)P
(1,1)
i (0, 1) is not separable over the
two-dimensional cube but it is semilattice single-peaked over (A,).
17For the illustration that we want to make here two objects is enough; the extension to the case
with three or more objects is straightforward.
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Let ka and kb be two integers such that 1 ≤ ka ≤ n and 1 ≤ kb ≤ n. According
to the terminology in Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991), applied to the case
with two objects, a rule f : Dn → A is voting by quota (ka, kb) if, for all P ∈ Dn,
object x ∈ {a, b} is an element of the chosen set at P (i.e., x ∈ f(P )) if and only
if |N(R, x)| ≥ kx. Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991) show that f : Sn → A is
strategy-proof, anonymous and onto if and only if f is voting by quota.
For the semilattice depicted in Figure 5, and since A⋆() = ∅, the unique strategy-
proof and simple rule on SSP()n is voting by quota (ka, kb) = (1, 1), which corre-
sponds to the sup rule. Figure 6 depicts the other three semilattices over A.
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Since A⋆(˜) = A⋆(̂) = A⋆() = ∅, the unique strategy-proof and simple rule in each
of the three cases is the one that corresponds to voting by quota (k˜a, k˜b) = (n, 1),
(k̂a, k̂b) = (1, n) and (k
a
, k
b
) = (n, n), or to sup˜, sup̂ and sup, respectively, each
corresponding to the unique strategy-proof and simple rule on the respective domains
SSP(˜)n, SSP(̂)n and SSP()n.
5 Rich domains and additional results
Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) shows that semilattice single-peakedness is a necessary
condition of a domain D admitting a strategy-proof and simple rule f : Dn → A,
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provided that n is even and D is rich.18 Here, we first present the Chatterji and
Masso´ (2018) notion of rich domain and show that, given any semilattice (A,), the
domain SP() is indeed rich, and hence SSP() is rich as well (richness is a property
inherited by supersets).
Definition 4 Let  be a binary relation over A. The domain D is rich on (A,)
if, for all x, y, z ∈ A with z /∈ [x, y] 6= ∅, there exist Rxi , R
y
i ∈ D such that yP
x
i z and
xP yi z.
To illustrate richness return to Example 1 and consider, for instance, alternatives
x3, x5, x8 ∈ A for which x8 /∈ [x3, x5] 6= ∅. In this case, P
x3
i , P
x5
i ∈ SSP() are such
that x5P
x3
i x8 and x3P
x5
i x8.
Well-known domains of preferences satisfying generalized notions of single-peakedness
studied in the literature are rich (see Chatterji and Masso´ (2018)). However, subsets
of single-peaked domains may not be rich, if they are substantially restricted; for
example, the Euclidean preference domain is not rich.19 Nevertheless, the set of all
single-peaked preferences SP() is rich on (A,). This result is stated as Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Let  be a semilattice over A. Then, the domain SP() is rich on (A,).
Proof Let x, y, z ∈ A be such that z /∈ [x, y] 6= ∅. Note that x 6= z and y 6= z. We
show that there is Rxi ∈ SP() such that yP
x
i z (to show that there is R
y
i ∈ SP()
such that xP yi z follows an analogous argument and it is omitted). If x = y then all
preferences Rxi ∈ SP() trivially fulfill yP
x
i z, so assume x 6= y. There are three cases
to consider:
1. y ≺ z. Then, x ≺ y ≺ z. By assumption, there exists at least one Rxi ∈ SP(),
and by part (i) of Definition 2, yP xi z.
2. z ≺ y. If z ≺ x, then z ≺ x ≺ y and there is Rxi ∈ SP() such that yP
x
i z, since
Definition 2 imposes no restriction on how Rxi should order y and z. Otherwise,
when z ⊀ x, if y = sup{x, z} we have yP
x
i z by part (ii) of Definition 2, whereas
18Note that our results in this paper hold for any n ≥ 2, independently on whether n is odd or
even.
19Let A be a subset of an Euclidean space, let ‖·‖ be the Euclidean norm and let x ∈ A. We
say that Rxi is an Euclidean preference if, for all y, z ∈ A, yR
x
i z if and only if ‖x− y‖ ≤ ‖x− z‖.
Euclidean domains are not rich: for each x ∈ A, there is only one Euclidean preference whose top is
x.
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if y 6= sup{x, z} Definition 2 imposes no restriction on how R
x
i should order y
and z, and so we can always take Rxi ∈ SP() such that yP
x
i z.
3. y ⊀ z or z ⊀ y. Notice that, in this case, y 6= sup{x, z}. Again, Definition 2
imposes no restriction on how Rxi should order y and z, and so we can always
take Rxi ∈ SP() such that yP
x
i z.
Hence, the domain SP() is rich on (A,). 
As we have already said, richness is a property inherited by larger domains. Hence,
we obtain, as a consequence of Lemma 1, that the domain SSP() is rich on (A,).
Corollary 2 Let  be a semilattice over A. Then, the domain SSP() is rich on
(A,).
Our approach in this paper takes as given a semilattice (A,) relative to which
the domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences SSP() is defined. Our main
result characterizes the class of all strategy-proof and simple rules on SSP()n.
The approach in Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) first takes as given a simple rule
f : D2 → A, defined for two agents on an arbitrary domain D. They define the
binary relation f over A induced by f as follows: for all x, y ∈ A,
x f y if and only if f(x, y) = x.
They first show that f is reflexive (since f is unanimous), antisymmetric (since f is
anonymous) and transitive whenever D is rich on (A,f ). Moreover, the supremum
(according to f ) of every pair of alternatives always exists. Hence, the partial order
f is a (join-)semilattice over the set of alternatives. Now, suppose that an arbitrary
simple rule g : Dn → A, for n even, is given. Define f g : D2 → A by setting, for all
x, y ∈ A,
f g(x, y) = g(x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
2
-times
, y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
2
-times
).
Chatterji and Masso´ (2018)’s main result says that if g : Dn → A is strategy-proof
and simple, n is even and D is rich on (A,f
g
), then D is a domain of semilattice
single-peaked preferences on (A,f
g
).
Following the point of view of Chatterji and Masso´ (2018) for n = 2, and extending
it to the case of any n ≥ 2, we define the binary relation f,k over A induced by a
simple rule f : Dn → A and some quota 1 ≤ k < n as follows.
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Definition 5 Let f : Dn → A be a simple rule and let k be an integer such that
1 ≤ k < n. The binary relation f,k (over A) induced by f with quota k is
defined by setting, for each pair x, y ∈ A,
x f,k y if and only if f(R) = x
for any R ∈ Dn such that t(R) = {x, y} and |N(R, x)| ≥ k.
Namely, x f,k y holds if and only if f selects x whenever at least k agents have
the top at x and all other agents have the top at y. Propositions 1 and 2 relate the
two different approaches. Proposition 1 for quota-supremum rules with any quota
and Proposition 2 for any strategy-proof and simple rule and quota one.
Proposition 1 states that if (A,) is a semilattice and f : SSP()n → A is a
quota-supremum rule with associate alternative x and quota qx = k, then supf,k A =
x and f,k coincides with  except for the comparisons involving x.
Proposition 1 Let  be a semilattice over A, let f : SSP()n → A be a quota-
supremum rule with associated alternative x ∈ A⋆() and quota qx = k, and let f,k
be the binary relation induced by f over A with quota k. Then,
(i) x f,k y for all y ∈ A \ {x},
(ii) y f,k z if and only if y  z for all distinct y, z ∈ A \ {x}.
Proof See Appendix 7.2. 
Proposition 2 generalizes the main point illustrated in Example 2, by establishing
that a strategy-proof and simple rule f : SSP()n → A coincides with the sup rule
if and only if  coincides with f,1 .
Proposition 2 Let  be a semilattice over A, let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-
proof and simple rule and let f,1 be the binary relation induced by f over A with
quota 1. Then, f = sup if and only if  is equal to 
f,1.
Proof See Appendix 7.3. 
We finish this section by showing that the domain SSP() is a maximal domain
for the sup rule.
Definition 6 Let D ⊆ R be a domain and let f : Rn → A be a simple rule such that
f : Dn → A is strategy-proof. The domain D is maximal for f if for any D˜ such
that D ( D˜ ⊆ R, the rule f : D˜n → A is not strategy-proof.
22
Proposition 3 Let  be a semilattice over A and let sup : SSP()
n → A be the
supremum rule. Then, SSP() is maximal for sup .
Proof See Appendix 7.4. 
Remark 4 When n = 2 the converse of Proposition 3 is also true: the only strategy-
proof and simple rule for which SSP() is maximal for it is the supremum rule.
Example 2 below illustrates this fact.
Example 2 (continued) The domain SSP(1) is not maximal for f2 and f3, but
either rule can be represented as the supremum of their respective induced semilattice
(with quota 1); namely, f2 = sup2 and f3 = sup3 , and 
f2,1=2 and 
f3,1=3.
Moreover, the maximal domains for the rules f2 and f3, that coincide with their
associated semilattice single-peaked domains, are obtained by adding to SSP(1)
the preference P yzi for rule f2 and the preference P
zy
i for rule f3; namely,
SSP(1) = {P
xy
i , P
xz
i , P
yx
i , P
zx
i }
SSP(2) = {P
xy
i , P
xz
i , P
yx
i , P
zx
i , P
yz
i } = SSP(1) ∪ {P
yz
i }
SSP(3) = {P
xy
i , P
xz
i , P
yx
i , P
zx
i , P
zy
i } = SSP(1) ∪ {P
zy
i }.
Of course, Propositions 2 and 3 are satisfied by f1 : SSP(1)
2 → A. It is easy
to check that f1(R) = sup1 t(R) for all R ∈ SSP(1)
2 and that 1=
f1 holds.
Moreover, SSP(1) is a maximal domain for f1 but SSP(2) is not because f1 :
SSP(2)
2 → A is not strategy-proof since
z = f1(P
zx
1 , P
zx
2 )P
yz
1 f1(P
yz
1 , P
zx
2 ) = x,
which means that agent 1 can manipulate f1 at (P
yz
1 , P
zx
2 ) by declaring P
zx
1 instead of
P yz1 . Observe that P
yz
1 /∈ SSP(1) and indeed, f1(P
yz
1 , P
zx
2 ) = x 6= y = sup2{y, z}
where {y, z} = t(P yz1 , P
zx
2 ) and 1 6=
f2 . Similarly, SSP(3) is not a maximal do-
main for f1 : SSP(3)
2 → A because it is not strategy-proof since
y = f1(P
yx
1 , P
yx
2 )P
zy
1 f1(P
zy
1 , P
yx
2 ) = x,
which means that agent 1 can manipulate f1 at (P
zy
1 , P
yx
2 ) by declaring P
yx
1 instead of
P zy1 . Observe that P
zy
1 /∈ SSP(1) and indeed, f1(P
zy
1 , P
yx
2 ) = x 6= z = sup3{y, z}
where {y, z} = t(P zy1 , P
yx
2 ) and 1 6=
f3 . 
The next example exhibits a simple and strategy-proof rule f : SSP()3 → A
such that SSP() is maximal for f but f 6= sup, so the converse of Proposition 3
does not hold for n > 2.
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Example 3 Let 1 be as in Example 2. Consider the rule f4 : SSP(1)
3 → A
described by
f4(y, y, z) = y
f4(x, y, y) = y
f4(y, z, z) = x
and
f4(x, x, y) = x
f4(x, y, z) = x
f4(x, z, z) = x
f4(x, x, z) = x
together with the corresponding choices required by unanimity and anonymity. It
is easy to check that f4 : SSP(1)
3 → A is strategy-proof. Then, f4 6= sup1 but
SSP(1) is maximal for f4, since the addition in the domain of either P
yz
i or P
zy
i
would induce a manipulation by some of the agents. To see that, suppose P yzi or P
zy
i
is available to agent 1. Then,
z = f4(P
zx
1 , P
zx
2 , P
zx
3 )P
yz
1 f4(P
yz
1 , P
zx
2 , P
zx
3 ) = x
or
y = f4(P
yx
1 , P
yx
2 , P
zx
3 )P
zy
1 f4(P
zy
1 , P
yx
2 , P
zx
3 ) = x,
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, the converse of Proposition 3 does not hold
for n > 2. 
6 Final remarks
We finish the paper with two remarks.
First, we have assumed, and intensively used from the very beginning, that |A| ≥
3. The case A = {x, y} is special since there are only two semilattices over A, x ≻x y
or y ≻y x, and they are somehow equivalent since the two corresponding semilattice
single-peaked domains coincide with the universal domain of strict preferences over
A; namely, SSP(≻x) = SSP(≻y) = {P xi , P
y
i } = R. It is well-known that when the
set of alternatives has cardinality two, the class of all strategy-proof and simple rules
is voting by quota (tx, ty) ∈ {1, . . . , n}2, where tx + ty = n + 1.20 When x is used as
the reference alternative, and y is identified with the empty set (“x is not elected”),
20This is equivalent to the one-object case of voting by committees in Barbera`, Sonnenschein and
Zhou (1991), after identifying either y with the empty set (“x is not elected”) or x with the empty
set (“y is not elected”). Then, the domain of separable (and additive) preferences coincides with
the universal domain of strict preferences.
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for all R ∈ Rn,
fx(R) =
{
x if |N(R, x)| ≥ tx
y otherwise,
(1)
or when y is used as a references alternative, and x is identified with the empty set
(“y is not elected”), for all R ∈ Rn,
f y(R) =
{
y if |N(R, y)| ≥ ty
x otherwise.
(2)
Since tx + ty = n+ 1, the two rules coincide because
|N(R, x)| ≥ tx
⇐⇒ |N(R, x)|+ ty ≥ n+ 1 = |N(R, x)|+ |N(R, y)|+ 1
⇐⇒ ty ≥ |N(R, y)|+ 1
⇐⇒ ty > |N(R, y)| .
Hence, for all R ∈ Rn, fx(R) = f y(R). For the semilattice ≻x, A⋆(≻x) = {y} and
f y : Rn → {x, y} in (2) is the description of voting by quota (tx, ty) as a quota-
supremum rule for y with quota ty, and for the semilattice ≻y, A⋆(≻y) = {x} and
fx : Rn → {x, y} in (1) is the description of voting by quota (tx, ty) as a quota-
supremum rule for x with quota tx. Hence, the characterization in Theorem 1 remains
valid even when |A| = 2.
Second, one may wonder whether our analysis of strategy-proof rules on semi-
lattice single-peaked domains could be straightforwardly extended to the analysis of
group strategy-proof rules on the same domain.21 The answer to this query is neg-
ative. The domain of semilattice single-peaked preferences does not satisfy indirect
sequential inclusion, the weaker condition on a domain identified by Barbera`, Berga
and Moreno (2010) as being sufficient for the equivalence of individual and group
strategy-proofness. To see that in general strategy-proofness is strictly weaker than
group strategy-proofness on semilattice single-peaked domains, consider again the
special case of voting by quota studied by Barbera`, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991)
with two objects (see Subsection 4.2). Then, voting by quota 1 for the two objects is
not efficient since sup{(1, 0), (0, 1)} = (1, 1) but there are separable preferences P
(1,0)
1
21If this would have been the case, some arguments in the proofs of our results would be simpler,
since instead of replacing the preferences of agents sequentially they could be replaced simultaneously
all together.
25
and P
(0,1)
2 for which (0, 0)P
(1,0)
1 (1, 1) and (0, 0)P
(0,1)
2 (1, 1). Hence, the sup rule al-
though strategy-proof on the domain SSP() it is not efficient, and so it is not group
strategy-proof, even on the set of separable preferences S over the two-dimensional
cube, a subdomain of semilattice single-peaked preferences on (A,).
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7 Appendix
7.1 Preliminary remarks and lemmata
Remarks 5 and 6 identify circumstances under which, given any three different alter-
natives x, y, z ∈ A, the set SSP() contains preferences with top on x that may or
may not freely order y and z. The two remarks will be useful in some of the proofs
that follow.
Remark 5 Let x, y, z ∈ A be three different alternatives and let  be a semilattice
over A. If x ≻ y, then
(i) there exists Rxi ∈ SSP() such that zP
x
i y,
(ii) there exists Rxi ∈ SSP() such that yP
x
i z.
Proof Suppose x, y, z ∈ A are three different alternatives with x ≻ y. We first
show that part (i) of the Remark holds. If z ∈ [y, x], then y /∈ [z, x] 6= ∅ and the
result follows from richness. If z /∈ [y, x], we will show that neither condition (i) nor
condition (ii) in Remark 1 characterizing semilattice single-peakedness imply yRxi z.
First, notice that since x ≻ y, condition (i) in Remark 1 cannot be applied, and
hence the ordering between y and z is unrestricted. Second, notice that although
y  x, condition (ii) in Remark 1 only implies x = sup{x, y}R
x
i y, and hence the
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ordering between y and z is also unrestricted. Thus, there exists Rxi ∈ SSP() such
that zP xi y. To show that part (ii) holds, notice that if z /∈ [y, x] the result follows
from richness; whereas if z ∈ [y, x] it follows that x ≻ z ≻ y and parts (i) and (ii) of
Remark 1 can not be applied, and hence the ordering between y and z is unrestricted.
Thus, there exists Rxi ∈ SSP() such that yP
x
i z. 
Remark 6 Let x, y, z ∈ A be three different alternatives and let  be a semilattice
over A. If x ⊁ y, y ⊁ x and z /∈ [x, sup{x, y}], then there is R
x
i ∈ SSP() such
that yP xi z.
Proof Let x, y, z ∈ A be three different alternatives and suppose x ⊁ y, y ⊁
x and z /∈ [x, sup{x, y}]. We will show that neither condition (i) nor condition
(ii) in Remark 1 characterizing semilattice single-peakedness imply that, for each
Rxi ∈SSP(), zR
x
i y holds. First, notice that since x ⊀ y, condition (i) in Remark 1
cannot be applied. Second, notice that since x ⊀ y, condition (ii) in Remark 1 only
implies that sup{x, y}R
x
i y. But since z 6= sup{x, y}, there exists R
x
i ∈SSP()
such that yP xi z. 
To illustrate the content of Remarks 5 and 6 return again to Example 1 and
observe, for instance, that
• x3 ≻ x1 and there exist P
x3
i , P̂
x3
i ∈ SSP() such that x1P
x3
i x2 and x2P̂
x3
i x1.
• x8 ⊁ x9, x9 ⊁ x8, sup{x8, x9} = x6 and x4 /∈ [x8, x6] and there is P
x8
i ∈
SSP() such that x9P
x8
i x4.
We next state and prove several lemmata that will be used in the proofs of the
Propositions and Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 Let  be a semilattice over A, let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-proof
and simple rule, and let R ∈ SSP()n. Assume x, y ∈ A are such that x ≻ y or
y ≻ x and t(R) = {x, y}. Then, f(R) ∈ {x, y}.
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. Without loss of generality, as-
sume x ≻ y. The proof is by induction on the cardinality of N(R, x). Consider first
N(R, x) = {i} (this implies N(R, y) = N \ {i}) and assume f(R) = z /∈ {x, y}. By
Remark 5 (ii), there is Rxi ∈ SSP() such that yP
x
i z. By tops-onlyness, f(R
x
i , R−i) =
f(R) = z. Furthermore, by unanimity, f(Ryi , R−i) = y for any R
y
i ∈ SSP(). Then,
f(Ryi , R−i) = yP
x
i z = f(R
x
i , R−i),
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contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R) ∈ {x, y}. Now, suppose R ∈ SSP()n
is such that, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 2, |N(R, x)| = k and f(R) = {x, y}. We want to see
that if R′ ∈ SSP()n is such that |N(R′, x)| = k+1, then f(R′) ∈ {x, y}. To obtain
a contradiction, suppose f(R′) = z /∈ {x, y}. Let i ∈ N(R′, x). By Remark 5 (ii),
there is Rxi ∈ SSP() such that yP
x
i z. By tops-onlyness, f(R
x
i , R
′
−i) = f(R
′) = z.
Furthermore, by the inductive hypothesis and tops-onlyness , f(Ryi , R
′
−i) ∈ {x, y} for
any Ryi ∈ SSP(). Then, in both case,
f(Ryi , R
′
−i)P
x
i z = f(R
x
i , R
′
−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R′) ∈ {x, y}. 
Lemma 3 Let  be a semilattice over A, let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-proof
and simple rule and let k be such that 1 ≤ k < n. Assume x, y ∈ A are such that x ≻ y
and there is R ∈ SSP()n such that t(R) = {x, y}, |N(R, y)| = k and f(R) = y.
Then, f(R˜) = y for each R˜ ∈ SSP()n such that |N(R˜, y)| ≥ k.
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. Let R˜ ∈ SSP()n be such that
|N(R˜, y)| ≥ k. We want to show that f(R˜) = y. Let S ⊂ N be such that S ⊆
N(R˜, y) and |S| = k. By anonymity, we can assume that N(R, y) = S. By tops-
onlyness, f(R˜S, R−S) = y. Let i ∈ N \ S. We claim that f(R˜S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) =
y. If not, f(R˜S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = w 6= y and, as x ≻ y, by Remark 5 (i) there is
Rxi ∈ SSP() such that wP
x
i y. Since N(R, y) = S, t(Ri) = x. By tops-onlyness,
f(R˜S, R
x
i , R−(S∪{i})) = f(R˜S, R−S). Therefore,
f(R˜S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = wP
x
i y = f(R˜S, R
x
i , R−(S∪{i})),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R˜S∪{i}, R−(S∪{i})) = y. Continuing in the
same way, we can successively change the preferences of each of the remaining agents
in N \ S to finally obtain f(R˜) = y. 
Lemma 4 Let  be a semilattice over A and let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-
proof and simple rule. Then, for each R ∈ SSP()n,
f(R) ∈
⋃
i∈N
[t(Ri), sup t(R)].
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. The proof is by induction on the
cardinality of t(R). If R ∈ SSP()n is such that |t(R)| = 1, then the result is
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trivially true by unanimity. Suppose that the result holds for any R ∈ SSP()n
such that |t(R)| = k and 1 ≤ k < n. Consider now a profile R ∈ SSP()n such
that t(R) = {x1, . . . , xk+1} and assume f(R) = y /∈ ∪
k+1
j=1 [xj , sup t(R)]. There are
two cases to consider.
1. sup t(R) ∈ t(R).Without loss of generality, assume sup t(R) = xk+1. Then,
∪k+1j=1 [xj , supt(R)] = ∪
k
j=1[xj , xk+1].
If |N(R, xk+1)| > 1, take any i ∈ N(R, xk+1) and consider R
′
i ∈ SSP() such
that t(R′i) ∈ t(R) \ {xk+1}. We claim that f(R
′
i, R−i) = z /∈ ∪
k
j=1[xj , xk+1]. If
z = y this is obvious, by the contradiction hypothesis, so assume z 6= y and, to
obtain a contradiction, suppose z ∈ ∪kj=1[xj , xk+1]. We now show that z 6= xk+1,
because otherwise,
f(R′i, R−i) = z = xk+1P
xk+1
i y = f(R
xk+1
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Thus, xk+1 ≻ z. By Remark 5 (ii) there is
R
xk+1
i ∈ SSP() such that zP
xk+1
i y.Notice that, by tops-onlyness, f(R
xk+1
i , R−i) =
f(R) = y. Therefore,
f(R′i, R−i) = zP
xk+1
i y = f(R
xk+1
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R′i, R−i) /∈ ∪
k
j=1[xj , xk+1]. If neces-
sary (i.e., if there are still several agents with top at xk+1), we repeat this process
until we obtain a profile R˜ such that t(R˜) = {x1, . . . , xk+1}, |N(R˜, xk+1)| = 1,
and f(R˜) = t /∈ ∪kj=1[xj , xk+1]. Hence, let N(R˜, xk+1) = {i} and consider
R′i ∈ SSP() such that t(R
′
i) ∈ t(R˜) \ {xk+1}. Let f(R
′
i, R˜−i) = w and
x˜ = sup{x1, . . . , xk}. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, w ∈ ∪
k
j=1[xj , x˜].
Therefore, xk+1 ≻ x˜  w and, by Remark 5 (ii), there is R
xk+1
i ∈ SSP()
such that wP
xk+1
i t. By tops-onlyness, f(R
xk+1
i , R˜−i) = f(R˜) = t. Therefore,
f(R′i, R˜−i) = wP
xk+1
i t = f(R
xk+1
i , R˜−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
2. sup t(R) /∈ t(R). Let x˜ = sup t(R). Consider any x
⋆ ∈ t(R) and let t⋆(R) =
{x ∈ t(R) : x  x⋆ or x⋆  x}. Notice that, since sup t(R) /∈ t(R), 1 ≤
|t⋆(R)| < |t(R)|. Let N⋆ = {i ∈ N : t(Ri) ∈ t
⋆(R)} and let i⋆ ∈ N(R, x⋆).
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Claim: Let i ∈ N⋆ and let R′
i
∈ SSP() be such that t(R′⋆
i
(R). Then,
f(R′
i
, R−i) /∈ ∪
k+1
j=1 [xj, x˜].
Let i ∈ N⋆, xi = t(Ri), and z = f(R
′
i, R−i). If z = y this is obvious, by
the contradiction hypothesis, so assume z 6= y and, to obtain a contradiction,
suppose z ∈ ∪k+1j=1 [xj , x˜]. Then, there is R
xi
i ∈ SSP() such that
zP xii y, (3)
where, remember, y = f(R). To see that (3) holds, there are two cases to
consider. First, assume that z  xi. As y /∈ ∪
k+1
j=1 [xj , x˜], it follows that y /∈ [xi, z]
and (3) is implied by richness. Second, assume that z  xi. If xi  z, (3) follows
from Remark 5 (ii). If xi  z, and since y /∈ [xi, x˜], (3) follows from Remark 6.
By tops-onlyness, f(Rxii , R−i) = f(R) = y. Therefore,
f(R′i, R−i) = zP
xi
i y = f(R
xi
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R′i, R−i) /∈ ∪
k+1
j=1 [xj , x˜] and the Claim
is proved.
Using the Claim, we proceed by changing the preferences of all the members
of N⋆ except i⋆. We obtain a new profile R˜ ∈ SSP() such that t(R˜) ⊂ t(R),
N(R˜, x⋆) = {i⋆}, and f(R˜) /∈ ∪k+1j=1 [xj , x˜].
To finish the proof, consider R′i⋆ ∈ SSP() such that t(R
′
i⋆) ∈ t(R) \ t
⋆(R).
Let t = f(R˜), w = f(R′i⋆ , R˜−i⋆) and x̂ = sup[t(R) \ t
⋆(R)]. Then, by the
inductive hypothesis, w ∈
⋃
xj∈t(R)\t⋆(R)
[xj , x̂]. Since sup{x
⋆, w} = x˜ and t /∈
[x⋆, x˜], by Remark 6, there is Rx
⋆
i⋆ ∈ SSP() such that wP
x⋆
i⋆ t. By tops-onlyness,
f(Rx
⋆
i⋆ , R˜−i) = f(R˜) = t. Therefore,
f(R′i⋆ , R˜−i⋆) = wP
x⋆
i⋆ t = f(R
x⋆
i⋆ , R˜−i⋆),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
Hence, f(R) ∈ ∪k+1j=1 [xj , sup t(R)]. 
Lemma 5 Let  be a semilattice over A and let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-
proof and simple rule. Let R ∈ SSP()n, x ∈ A, i ∈ N and Rxi ∈ SSP(). If
x ≻ t(Ri), x ≻ f(R) and f(R) /∈ [t(Ri), x], then
f(Rxi , R−i) = f(R).
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Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. First, notice that
f(Rxi , R−i) ∈ {f(R), x}. (4)
Otherwise, since x ≻ f(R), by Remark 5 (ii) there is R˜xi ∈ SSP() such that
f(R)P˜ xi f(R
x
i , R−i). By tops-onlyness, f(R
x
i , R−i) = f(R˜
x
i , R−i). Therefore,
f(R)P˜ xi f(R˜
x
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Second, assume f(Rxi , R−i) = x. Since f(R) /∈
[t(Ri), x], by richness there is R˜i ∈ SSP() such that t(R˜i) = t(Ri) and xP˜if(R).
By tops-onlyness, f(R) = f(R˜i, R−i). Therefore,
f(Rxi , R−i)P˜if(R˜i, R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. To conclude, as (4) holds and f(Rxi , R−i) 6= x, the
result follows. 
Lemma 6 Let  be a semilattice over A and let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-
proof and simple rule. If R ∈ SSP()n is such that sup t(R) /∈ t(R) and sup t(R) ≻
f(R), then there is R˜ ∈ SSP()n such that sup t(R˜) = sup t(R), sup t(R˜) ∈ t(R˜),
and f(R˜) = f(R).
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. Take i ∈ N such that f(R) /∈
[t(Ri), sup t(R)] (such i exists, because otherwise f(R) = sup t(R)). Let R
′
i ∈
SSP() be such that t(R′i) = sup t(R) and consider the profile R˜ = (R
′
i, R−i).
Then, sup t(R˜) = sup t(R) ∈ t(R˜) and since f(R) /∈ [t(Ri), sup t(R)] holds, by
Lemma 5, f(R˜) = f(R). 
Lemma 7 Let  be a semilattice over A, let f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-proof
and simple rule and let k be such that 1 ≤ k < n. Assume x, y ∈ A are such that x ≻ y
and there is R ∈ SSP()n such that t(R) = {x, y}, |N(R, y)| = k and f(R) = y.
Then, f(R˜) ∈ {y, sup t(R˜)} for all R˜ ∈ SSP()
n such that |N(R˜, y)| < k.
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. Let R˜ ∈ SSP()n be such that
|N(R˜, y)| = k − 1. If k = 1 then t(R˜) = {x}, and by unanimity, f(R˜) = x =
sup t(R˜) and the statement holds trivially. Suppose k > 1. Let i ∈ N(R, y) and set
S ≡ N(R, y) \ {i}. By anonymity, we can assume S = N(R˜, y). By tops-onlyness,
f(R˜S, R−S) = f(R). Let j ∈ N(R, x). First, we show that
f(R˜S∪{j}, R−(S∪{j})) = y. (5)
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Otherwise, since x ≻ y, by Remark 5 (i) there is Rxj ∈ SSP() such that
f(R˜S∪{j}, R−(S∪{j}))P
x
j y.
By tops-onlyness, f(R˜S, R
x
j , R−(S∪{j})) = f(R˜S, R−S) = y. Therefore,
f(R˜S∪{j}, R−(S∪{j}))P
x
j (R˜S, R
x
j , R−(S∪{j})),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Thus, (5) holds. Continuing in the same way, we
can change the preferences of each of the remaining agents in N(R, x) to obtain
f(R˜−i, Ri) = y. (6)
Next, we show that f(R˜) ∈ {y, sup t(R˜)}. Let s ≡ sup t(R˜) and, to get a con-
tradiction, suppose f(R˜) /∈ {y, s}. Then, as f(R˜) ≺ s by Lemma 4, we can assume
that R˜ is such that s ∈ t(R˜) by Lemma 6. By anonymity, assume i ∈ N(R, s).
Since s ≻ f(R˜), by Remark 5 (i) there is Rsi ∈ SSP() such that yP
s
i f(R˜). By
tops-onlyness, f(R˜) = f(Rsi , R˜−i). Therefore, using (6),,
f(Ri, R˜−i)P
s
i f(R
s
i , R˜−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R˜) ∈ {y, s}.
We just proved the Lemma when R˜ is such that |N(R˜, y)| = k − 1. In order
to prove the statement for a profile R̂ such that N(R̂, y) = k − 2 we use a similar
reasoning and the fact that the result is true whenever there are k − 1 tops in y. We
successively apply the same reasoning to profiles in which the cardinality of the set
of agents with top in y is smaller. 
Lemma 8 Let  be a semilattice over A such that there is supA ≡ α and let
f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-proof and simple rule. Assume f(R) = α whenever
α ∈ t(R). Then, f(R) = sup t(R) for each R ∈ SSP()
n.
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. To obtain a contradiction, assume
there is R ∈ SSP()n such that f(R) 6= sup t(R). Since f(R) ∈ ∪i∈N [t(Ri), sup t(R)]
by Lemma 4,
sup t(R) ≻ f(R). (7)
By Lemma 6, it is without loss of generality to assume that sup t(R) ∈ t(R). Let
i ∈ N(R, sup t(R)). As α  sup t(R) ≻ f(R), by richness, there is R
′
i ∈ SSP()
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such that t(R′i) = sup t(R) and αP
′
if(R). By tops-onlyness, f(R
′
i, R−i) = f(R). By
the hypothesis, f(Rαi , R−i) = α for any R
α
i ∈ SSP(). Therefore,
f(Rαi , R−i) = αP
′
if(R) = f(R
′
i, R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f(R) = sup t(R). 
Lemma 9 Let  be a semilattice over A such that supA does not exist and let
f : SSP()n → A be a strategy-proof and simple rule. Then, f(R) = sup t(R) for
each R ∈ SSP()n.
Proof Let the hypothesis of the Lemma hold. Notice first that, if |t(R)| = 1 then
the result follows by unanimity. To obtain a contradiction, let R ∈ SSPn, with
|t(R)| > 1, be such that f(R) 6= sup t(R). Since f(R) ∈ ∪i∈N [t(Ri), supt(R)] by
Lemma 4,
sup t(R) ≻ f(R). (8)
By Lemma 6, it is without loss of generality to assume that sup t(R) ∈ t(R). Let
s ≡ sup t(R). (9)
First, notice that there is x ∈ A such that x ≻ s. Since, by the hypothesis, there is
no supA, there exists y ∈ A such that s  y. If y ≻ s, take x = y; whereas if s  y
and y  s, take x = sup{s, y}. We now proceed through several steps.
Claim 1: If S ⊆ N(R, s) and R˜S ∈ SSP()
|S| is such that t(R˜i) = x for
each i ∈ S, then f(R˜S, R−S) = f(R).
The proof is by induction on the cardinality of S. Suppose first that S = {i} and
consider any R˜i ∈ SSP() such that t(R˜i) = x. As f(R) /∈ [s, x], by Lemma 5,
f(R˜i, R−i) = f(R). (10)
Suppose now that f(R˜S, R−S) = f(R) and consider i ∈ N(R, s)\S. Let R˜i ∈ SSP()
be such that t(R˜i) = x. As f(R˜S, R−S) /∈ [s, x], by Lemma 5,
f(R˜S∪{i}, R−S∪{i}) = f(R˜S, R−S). (11)
Thus, f(R˜S∪{i}, R−S∪{i}) = f(R) and the Claim holds.
Claim 2: If S ⊇ N(R, s) and R˜S ∈ SSP()
|S| is such that t(R˜i) = x for
each i ∈ S, then f(R˜S, R−S) = f(R).
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The proof is by induction on the cardinality of S. Let N˜ ≡ N(R, s), i /∈ N˜ and
consider R˜
N˜
∈ SSP()|N˜ | with t(R˜j) = x for each j ∈ N˜ and R
′
i ∈ SSP() with
t(R′i) = s. Since s ≻ f(R) and f(RN˜ , R−N˜ ) = f(R) by Claim 1, by Lemma 5 it
follows that
f(R′i, R˜N˜ , R−(N˜∪{i})) = f(R˜N˜ , R−N˜).
Now consider R˜i ∈ SSP() such that t(R˜i) = x. Since x ≻ f(R) and f(R˜N˜ , R−N˜ ) =
f(R) by Claim 1, by Lemma 5 it follows that
f(R˜N˜∪{i}, R−(N˜∪{i})) = f(R˜N˜ , R−N˜).
To finish the proof of Claim 2, suppose next that S ) N(R, s), R˜S ∈ SSP()|S|
is such that t(R˜i) = x for each i ∈ S and f(R˜S, R−S) = f(R). Let i /∈ S. First,
let R′i ∈ SSP() such that t(R
′
i) = s. By an analogous reasoning as the one pre-
sented to obtain (10), we can prove that f(R′i, R˜S, R−(S∪i)) = f(R˜S, R−S). Second,
let R˜i ∈ SSP() be such that t(R˜i) = x. By an analogous reasoning as the one pre-
sented to obtain (11), we can prove that f(R˜S∪i, R−(S∪i)) = f(R˜S, R−S). Therefore,
f(R˜S∪i, R−(S∪i)) = f(R) and the inductive proof is complete.
Concluding. Let R˜ ∈ SSP()n be such that t(R˜i) = x for each i ∈ N. By una-
nimity, f(R˜) = x. Applying Claim 2 when S = N we get f(R˜) = f(R). Then,
f(R) = x. But, as x ≻ s and s ≻ f(R), it follows by (8) and (9) that f(R) ≻ f(R),
a contradiction. Hence, f(R) = sup t(R) for each R ∈ SSP()
n. 
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Let the hypothesis of the Proposition hold.
(i) This is direct consequence of the fact that f is a quota-supremum with associated
alternative x and quota k.
(ii) (=⇒) Assume y f,k z. Since f is a quota-supremum, α = supA exists. Since
y and z are different and y 6= x, we claim that z 6= α. Otherwise, y f,k α implies
f(R) = y for R̂ ∈ SSPn such that t(R̂) = {y, α} and |N(R̂, y)| ≥ k, contradicting the
definition of quota-supremum. Therefore, z 6= α. Next, suppose, to get a contradic-
tion, that y  z. First, consider the case z ≻ y. Let i ∈ N, and let R ∈ SSP()n be
such that t(Ri) = z, |N(R, y)| = k−1 and |N(R, α)| = n−k. Then, by the definition
of f as a quota-supremum rule with associate alternative and quota k, f(R) = α.
Consider any Ryi ∈ SSP(). As y 
f,k z, z ≻ y and profile (Ryi , R−i) reaches the
quota k for alternative y, f(Ryi , R−i) = y by Lemma 3. As z ≻ y, by Remark 5
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(ii), there is Rzi ∈ SSP() such that yP
z
i α. By tops-onlyness, f(R
z
i , R−i) = f(R).
Therefore,
f(Ryi , R−i) = yP
z
i α = f(R
z
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness. Second, consider the case z  y. Let t ≡ sup{y, z}.
Then t ≻ y. Let R ∈ SSP()n be such that t(R) = {y, z} and |N(R, y)| = k. By
definition of quota-supremum, f(R) = sup{y, z} = t 6= y, which contradicts y 
f,k z.
Thus, y  z.
(⇐=) Assume y  z. Let R ∈ SSP()n be such that t(R) = {y, z} and |N(R, y)| ≥
k. As f is a quota-supremum with associated alternative x and quota k, f(R) =
sup{y, z} = y, which implies y 
f,k z. 
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let the hypothesis of the Proposition hold.
(=⇒) Let x, y ∈ A and assume f(R) = sup t(R) for each R ∈ SSP()
n. First,
suppose x  y, take i ∈ N and R˜ ∈ SSP()n such that t(R˜i) = x and t(R˜j) = y for
each j ∈ N \ {i}. Since sup t(R˜) = x, then f(R˜) = x. Therefore, x 
f,1 y. Second,
suppose x f,1 y. If R˜ ∈ SSP()n is as before, then x = f(R˜) = sup t(R˜) and
x  y.
(⇐=) Assume  is equal to f,1 but f 6= sup . By Lemmata 8 and 9, there are
α ∈ A such that α = supA and R˜ ∈ SSP()
n such that α ∈ t(R˜) and f(R˜) 6= α.
Let x ≡ f(R˜) and let i ∈ N(R˜, α). Consider j ∈ N \ {i} and take any Rxj ∈ SSP().
By strategy-proofness, f(Rj , R˜−j) = x. Continuing in the same way, we successively
change each of the preferences of the remaining agents in N \ {i} to preferences with
top in x obtaining, by strategy-proofness,
f(R˜i, R
x
−i) = x. (12)
As α = supA, α  x. Then, by the hypothesis, α 
f,1 x which implies f(R˜i, R
x
−i) =
α since i ∈ N(R˜, α). But this contradicts (12). 
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Let the hypothesis of the Proposition hold. Assume SSP() is not maximal for
sup . Then, there is R̂i ∈ R \ SSP() such that sup : [SSP() ∪ {R̂i}]
n → A is
simple and strategy-proof. By Remark 1 characterizing semilattice single-peakedness,
there are two cases to consider:
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1. There are x, y, z ∈ A with z ≻ y ≻ x, t(R̂i) = x and zP̂iy. Let R−i ∈
SSP()n−1 be such that t(Rj) = y for each j ∈ N \ {i} and let R
z
i ∈ SSP()
be arbitrary. As z ≻ y ≻ x,
sup(R
z
i , R−i) = zP̂iy = sup(R̂i, R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
2. There are x,w ∈ A such that w  x, t(R̂i) = x and wP̂i sup{x,w}.
First, notice that x  w also. Otherwise wP̂ix, contradicting the fact that
t(R̂i) = x. Let t = sup{x, w} and consider R−i ∈ SSP()
n−1 such that
t(Rj) = w for each j ∈ N \ {i} and any R
w
i ∈ SSP(). Then,
sup(R
w
i , R−i) = wP̂it = sup(R̂i, R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
Hence, SSP() is maximal for sup . 
7.5 Proof of Theorem 1
(=⇒) Assume f : SSP()n → A is a strategy-proof and simple rule. If there is
no supA, by Lemma 9, f(R) = sup t(R) for each R ∈ SSP()
n, and therefore
f = sup . So let us assume there is supA. Let α ≡ supA and consider f 6= sup .
By Lemma 8, there is R⋆ ∈ SSP()n such that α ∈ t(R⋆) and f(R⋆) 6= α. Let
x ≡ f(R⋆) and let
k⋆ ≡ min
k
{k = |N(R, x)| : R ∈ SSP()n with t(R) = {α, x} and f(R) = x} .
Step 1: x ∈ A⋆(). We need to prove that, for y ∈ A \ {α, x}, x  y and y  x.
In order to get a contradiction, first suppose y  x. Let R ∈ SSP()n be such
that t(R) = {x, α} and |N(R, x)| = k⋆. Then, f(R) = x by the definition of k⋆. Let
i ∈ N(R, x) and consider any Ryi ∈ SSP(). By Lemma 7, f(R
y
i , R−i) ∈ {x, α}.
There are two cases to consider:
1.1. f(Ryi , R−i) = x. As y ≻ x, by Remark 5 (i) there is R˜
y
i ∈ SSP() such
that αP˜ yi x. By tops-onlyness, f(R˜
y
i , R−i) = f(R
y
i , R−i). Let R
α
i ∈ SSP() be
arbitrary. By the definition of k⋆ and Lemma 2, f(Rαi , R−i) = α. Therefore,
f(Rαi , R−i) = αP˜
y
i x = f(R˜
y
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
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1.2. f(Ryi , R−i) = α. As y ≻ x, by Remark 5 (ii) there is R˜
y
i ∈ SSP() such that
xP˜ yi α. By tops-onlyness, f(R˜
y
i , R−i) = f(R
y
i , R−i). Therefore,
f(R) = xP˜ yi α = f(R˜
y
i , R−i),
contradicting strategy-proofness.
Thus, y  x. The case x  y follows a similar argument, interchanging the roles
of x and y. Hence, x ∈ A⋆().
Step 2: f ∈ Q() with associated alternative x and quota qx = k⋆. Let
R ∈ SSP()n. There are two cases to consider:
2.1. |N(R, x)| ≥ k⋆. Then f(R) = x by Lemma 3.
2.2. |N(R, x)| < k⋆.We want show that f(R) = sup t(R). Notice that, by Lemma
7, f(R) ∈ {x, sup t(R)}. In order to get a contradiction, assume f(R) = x.
Let Nx ≡ N(R, x) and Nα ≡ N(R, α). Consider first the case Nα = ∅. Let
i ∈ N\Nx. As α ≻ t(Ri) and f(R) /∈ [t(Ri), α] (since f(R) ∈ A
⋆()), by Lemma
5, f(Rαi , R−i) = f(R) = x. Continuing in the same way, we successively change
preferences of all the remaining agents in N \Nx to obtain f(RNx , R
α
−Nx) = x.
But this contradicts the definition of k⋆.
To finish, consider the case Nα 6= ∅. Let RαNα ∈ SSP()
|Nα|. By tops-onlyness,
f(RαNα, R−Nα) = f(R) = x. Next, let i ∈ N \ (N
x ∪Nα), which exists because
otherwise N \ (Nx ∪ Nα) = ∅ would imply f(R) = α, a contradiction. As α ≻
t(Ri) and f(R
α
Nα, R−Nα) /∈ [t(Ri), α], by Lemma 5, f(R
α
Nα∪{i}, R−(Nα∪{i})) =
x. Continuing in the same way, we successively change preferences of all the
remaining agents in N \ (Nx ∪ Nα) to obtain f(RNx∪Nα , R
α
−(Nx∪Nα)) = x. But
this also contradicts the definition of k⋆.
(⇐=) That sup is strategy-proof and simple has been presented in the main text
(see Section 3). Let f be a quota-supremum rule with associated alternative x and
quota qx. By definition, f is unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, and therefore
simple. We know show that f is also strategy-proof. Let R ∈ SSP()n, i ∈ N
and R′i ∈ SSP() be arbitrary, and assume f(R) 6= t(Ri). There are two cases to
consider:
1. f(R) = x. Since x ∈ A⋆(), |N(R, x)| ≥ k. As t(Ri) 6= x, f(R
′
i, R−i) = x
because |N((R′i, R−i), x)| ≥ |N(R, x)|. Thus, there is no profitable manipulation
from agent i.
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2. f(R) = sup t(R). We want to show that
f(R)Rif(R
′
i, R−i). (13)
If f(R′i, R−i) = sup(R
′
i, R−i), then by semilattice single-peakedness and asso-
ciativity of the supremum,
f(R) = sup{t(Ri), supt(R−i)} Ri sup{t(R
′
i), supt(R−i)} = f(R
′
i, R−i),
so (13) holds. If f(R′i, R−i) = x, as x ∈ A
⋆(), it follows that t(Ri)  x and,
by Remark 1 (ii),
α = sup{t(Ri), x}Rix. (14)
Also, since t(Ri)  supt(R)  α, by Remark 1 (i),
supt(R)Riα. (15)
Therefore, by hypothesis and using (14) and (15) we obtain
f(R) = supt(R)Rix = f(R
′
i, R−i),
so (13) holds.
Hence, the quota-supremum rule f is strategy-proof. 
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